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Shades of Gray Deterrence: Issues of Fighting in the Gray Zone
Abstract
This article addresses the concept of ‘gray wars’ as it relates to contemporary conflicts and
the limits of American conventional deterrence and compellence. It more clearly defines
the concept of gray wars for the current era and contrasts Cold War versus post-Cold War
gray zone conflicts exposing the limits of current approaches. Finally, the article advocates
for a new concept – “gray deterrence” – identifying strategies that can be used by the
United States to confront ‘gray’ actors in a way that adheres to international laws and
norms, but seeks to shape and influence the cost-benefit analysis of ‘gray’ actor behavior.
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Introduction
The United States has a deterrence problem. Adversaries all over the world
increasingly engage in political warfare, amalgamations of war and peace that
are difficult to address. Clandestine Russian military forces infiltrated eastern
Ukraine, arming separatists and fomenting rebellion.1 State sponsored
hackers penetrate US government information systems to target US personnel
for counter-intelligence, while also trying to influence national elections.2
Taliban fighters gain ground in areas where International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) troops once fought and died.3 Al-Shabaab regularly stages
spectacular attacks against the Somali government and African Union
peacekeepers.4 Boko Haram destabilizes West Africa, and the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) is Central Africa’s most enduring and brutal terrorist
group.5 Houthi rebels easily seized the capital of Yemen in 2015, despite US
drone strikes since 2002 attempting to defend the regime.6 The United States
finds itself in a complicated fight against ISIS (also known as Daesh) and
many others dedicated to supporting the Islamic State’s caliphate. 7 Many of
these adversaries appear to be exploiting the international system and its laws
Nicu Popescu, “Hybrid Tactics: Neither New nor Only Russian,” European Union
Institute for Security Studies 4 (2015): 1-2.
2 Jim Sciutto, “China, Russia Amassing Personal Info Seized In Hacks For CounterIntelligence,” CNN, September 2, 2015, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/01/politics/china-russia-cyberattacks-military/; Julie
Hirschfeld Davis and Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump Concedes Russia’s Interference
in Election,” The New York Times, January 11, 2017, available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trumps-press-conference-highlightsrussia.html?_r=0.
3 John F. Sopko, SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2016, available at:
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-01-30qr.pdf.
4 Harun Maruf, “Al-Shabab Attacks Military Camps in Somalia, at Least 2 Dead,” Voice of
America, February 12, 2017, available at: http://www.voanews.com/a/al-shababattacks-military-camps-in-somalia/3719957.html.
5 Freedom C. Onuoha. “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis
Explained,” African security review 19: 2 (2010): 54-67; Tim Allen and Koen
Vlassenroot, The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (New York: Zed Books,
2010). For an explanation of LRA resilience, consider Christopher R. Day, “‘Survival
Mode’: Rebel Resilience and the Lord’s Resistance Army,” Terrorism and Political
Violence (March 28, 2017): 1-21, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1300580.
6 A comprehensive list of all drone strikes in Yemen available at:
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/.
7 New York Times provides an interesting breakdown of the complicated friendships and
enemy relationships involved in the fight against ISIS, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/16/world/middleeast/untangling-theoverlapping-conflicts-in-the-syrian-war.html?_r=0; ISIS aligned fighters have popped
up in Libya, Indonesia, Somalia, and Afghanistan, just to name a few. See article available
at: http://www.americansecurityproject.org/where-is-isis-going-in-2016/, for an
explanation of where ISIS wants to expand its operations.
1
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and rules, which were set up slowly since the end of World War II. How can
the United States and her Western allies deter such opponents that do not
fear the coercive consequences or credibility of Western resolve? Such foes
appear to be capitalizing on globalization and the medium this globalized
information environment provides in the creation of strategic narratives that
upend Western strategies to contain and deter.
Such events include elements of political warfare, of which George Kennan
defined as “the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of
peace…short of war, to achieve…objectives.”8 These ‘gray’ actions exploit
blurred boundaries of sovereignty or laws, and overwhelming US military
force cannot solve these issues because of possible unintended consequences.9
In fact, prevalent policymaker attitudes in Washington D.C. that see these
issues as solvable through risk-averse airstrikes make many of these problems
worse.10 Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright best summed up this
endemic culture when she rhetorically asked, “What's the point of having this
superb military…if we can't use it?”11
The “gray zone” is a nuanced form of warfare where antagonists seek limited
political victories, as opposed to outright military triumphs that would be
easier to identify and respond. Additionally, such “gray zone” actors act in a
nebulous manner that does not explicitly violate the current post-Cold War
international system of norms and values situated around American power
and institutional norms and values. General Joseph Votel, former
Commander of US Special Operations Command, lamented that enemies

George Kennan, “Policy Planning Memorandum,” May 4, 1948, National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2,
available at: http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm.
Of course, one can make an argument that ISIS is waging an all-out war in hopes of
provoking an all-out Western attack against it. However, for the sake of the argument in
this article, it is not a formal state within the international system, and therefore they fall
into that gray space of warfare.
9 Here is a list of serval prominent authors making ‘blowback’ arguments against the US:
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs And Consequences Of American Empire (New
York: Macmillan, 2000); Carl Boggs, Masters Of War: Militarism And Blowback In The
Era Of American Empire (New York: Routledge, 2013); Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens,
and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From The New American Way of War,”
Middle East Policy 18:3 (2011): 122-132, available at: http://www.mepc.org/dronewarfare-blowback-new-american-way-war.
10 Mike Benitez and Mike Pietrucha, “Political Airpower, Part II: The Seductive Allure of
Precision Weapons,” War on the Rocks, November 30, 2016, available at:
https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/political-airpower-part-ii-the-seductive-allure-ofprecision-weapons/.
11 Michael Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-Century Odyssey (New York:
Macmillan, 2000), 360.
8
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operating in the “gray zone” have forced American foreign policy to confront
the “ambiguity in the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the
validity of the legal and political claims at stake.”12 Various actors, state and
non-state, pursue low-intensity actions despite knowing that the United
States wields the most powerful military in the world.13 In this environment
the traditional American conventional deterrence model of threatening
overwhelming force ostensibly does not work. Deterring every course of
action for an adversary is basically impossible, but they are generally deterred
from waging the sort of conventional warfare utilized during World War II.
Saddam Hussein ignored such lessons at his own peril in 1991 and in 2003
when he attempted to fight in a conventional fashion against the Unites States
and her allies, whereas Russia subtly employed varying types of conventional
and unconventional tools during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.14 This may
explain why some competitors appear to increasingly rely on hybrid warfare
strategies, with traditional uniformed armed forces employed less and "all
forms of war and tactics" being utilized throughout all levels, realms, and
domains.15 Such behavior skirts the traditional norms established in jus in
bello and jus in bello.
What works or might work, or what might be elements of a solution, requires
the United States and allies to adapt their foreign policy and military
institutions to a post-Cold War world where tactical mistakes can give an
adversary a strategic victory. This is exactly why US General Charles C. Krulak
coined the phrase “Strategic Corporal” in 1999 to imply the large impact a few
low-ranking American troops could have in a foreign crisis.16 Indeed, there
have continued to be major ramifications for the tactical mistake made by US
service members when an AC-130 gunship accidently destroyed the Kunduz

General Joseph L. Votel, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 7, available at:
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150318/103157/HMTG-114-AS26-WstateVotelUSAJ-20150318.pdf.
13 Global Firepower, “Countries Ranked by Military Strength,” GFP: Strength in
Numbers, 2016, available at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator of Democratization?
Russia's role in Georgia and Ukraine,” Democratization 22:3 (2015): 459-478, available
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.996135.
15 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 52 (First
Quarter, 2009), 34, available at:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf.
16 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,”
Marines Magazine (January 1999), available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA399413.
12
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hospital in Afghanistan, killing 30 people, including patients and Doctors
Without Borders staff.17
More importantly, it is also important to identify that certain ‘non-influential
conflicts’ should be placed outside the scope of what can be considered “gray
wars,” as some do not directly affect American or Western interests.18 While it
might be contentious to some practitioners to conclude that some conflicts in
the world should be left out of the “gray zone” war categorization, it is vital to
acknowledge that the United States cannot address every single one,
especially if it is to succeed in one’s that have a significant and tangible impact
on America and her allies. Indeed, core US interests should remain focused
on deterring attacks on the United States and its strategic allies to maintain
an international system reliant on Western values and norms, while
preventing the rise of hostile competitors, and stymieing threats to the
viability of major international systems such as trade and finance.
To defend this thesis, one must first more clearly define “gray zone” warfare
beyond RAND political scientist Michael Mazarr’s description. Next,
contrasting the ways in which the United States engaged in ‘gray-like’ actions
during the Cold War versus the post-Cold War era helps trace the faults
within today’s overreliance on conventional deterrence. From this, a new
paradigm of “gray deterrence” emerges to conceptualize an improved
American way of deterring state and non-state ‘gray’ threats, while upholding
the current international order, necessitating adherence to post-Cold War
norms, laws, treaties, and customs.

Defining the Gray Zone
There is plenty of room to criticize the “gray zone” as just another tautological
expression of hybrid warfare, non-linear warfare, 4th generation warfare,
unconventional warfare, proxy wars, and so on. 19 However, the ‘gray zone’ is

Rod Nordland, “U.S. General Says Kunduz Hospital Strike Was ‘Avoidable’,” The New
York Times, November 25, 2016, available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/asia/afghanistan-kunduz-hospitalairstrike.html.
18 Such historical examples include the Chechen Insurgency in Russia, Tamil Tiger
insurgency in Sri Lanka, India-Pakistan conflict over the Kashmir, and Casamance
Conflict in Senegal.
19 Adam Elkus, “50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray Wars Concept Lacks Strategic Sense,”
War on the Rocks, December 15, 2015, available at:
https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50-shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-conceptlacks-strategic-sense/.
17
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more than a new buzzword.20 According to Mazarr, gray zone conflicts are
those in which an opponent engages in a gradualist form of warfare that seeks
to modify some component of the international system, using “hard” and
“soft” forms of power in an unconventional manner, making it difficult to
adequately respond.21 The international system is already largely a paxAmericana system of preferences and desired outcomes. Thus, "gray zone"
warfare is best defined as an aggressor engaging in political actions that
circumvent traditional norms and laws of war in the pursuit of narrow
political strategic objectives (e.g., subversion against a government) that are
difficult to achieve with traditional state conventional force options. The
government on the receiving end usually struggles to confront and limit the
aggressors’ actions, either because it cannot sufficiently deploy resources due
to perceived or real domestic and international constraints and/or because it
cannot effectively counter the aggressor, which purposefully avoids direct
confrontations. These ‘aggressors’ can be state or non-state actors, and to be
truly codified as “gray,” the United States led western order needs to have an
interest in shaping the outcome toward its preferences. The ‘gray’ antagonist
wages a subtle war in which they are better able to control informational
narratives and conduct their warfare in such a way that it prevents the state
from unleashing all of its “hard” and “soft” power to defeat it. Properly
addressing a ‘gray’ adversary in such a context necessitates the use of proper
doses of instrumental power to address it when it is ‘cold’ and ‘hot’.22
Demarcating the arena of “gray zone” warfare allows for a more focused
evaluation of conflicts that impinge on the American led world order. For
example, the Tamil Tigers insurgency in Sri Lanka was not a 'gray war'
because this conflict did not affect US national interests.23 On the other hand,
the Moro Conflict in the Philippines is a 'gray zone' conflict because America
is an ally with a Navy port stop; hence, this insurgency impinges upon US
national interests. The delineation of the “gray zone” excludes the actions of
Chechen rebels in Russia. Their secessionist actions against Russia is an
attempt to gain sovereignty, by trying to establish Chechen autonomy and
independence. Essentially, the United States has little or no national interest,
Obsession with new buzzwords in academia was best expressed with the invention of
RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) in the 1990s.
21 Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict
(Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015).
22 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International, 2006), 47-59.
23 American resources were never committed to training, assisting, or advising the Sri
Lankan military in the fight against the Tamil Tigers, thus it would appear that such a
conflict did not bear upon US national security interests, nor did its outcome influence
grand American strategies.
20
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other than to watch Russia squander resources and prestige in a fight against
Chechen separatists. The major point here is that some conflicts might appear
to be ‘gray-like’, but should only be categorized as so if it directly confronts or
disrupts the established international system. Best put by the former
Secretary of State, James Baker, there are some conflicts in the world where
the United States has “no dog in that fight,” thus not every armed struggle
should be viewed through the “gray zone” lens by US practitioners since there
are zero-sum implications in trying to wield and employ American
instruments of power everywhere at once.24

Conventional Deterrence: Cold War versus post-Cold War
When most scholars think of deterrence, the traditional notion of nuclear
warfare and “MAD” (Mutually Assured Destruction) come to mind. However,
there is much more nuance to deterrence than that. Outside of nuclear
deterrence questions and issues, George Kennan in his famous Long
Telegram to Washington D.C. in 1946 stated that the Soviets were “highly
sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can easily withdraw – and
usually does – when strong resistance is encountered at any point,” leading
them to back down.25 Out of this American understanding, ideas of
containment, deterrence, and compellence, were borne out in the Cold War.
At its core, deterrence is concerned with “shaping another’s perception of
costs and benefits to dissuade threatening behavior.”26
However, the nature and framework of deterrence has radically changed over
the last seven decades, just as how the United States and other countries
behaved in relation to international laws and norms. Today, political warfare
is gray zone warfare when viewed from a post-Cold War lens, but during the
Cold War, political and military elites in America and the Soviet Union
perceived these actions as the only way of pursuing ideological goals without
facing a 'hot' nuclear war.27 The nature of the political system during the Cold
War presented the United States and Soviet Union the opportunity to engage
in varying degrees of political warfare in hopes of shaping the international
Quoted in John Shattuck, Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America’s
Response (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
25 Joseph M. Siracusa and David G. Coleman, Depression to Cold War: A History of
America from Herbert Hoover to Ronald Reagan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing
Group, 2002), 123.
26 Thomas G. Mahnken, Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons: A
Comprehensive Approach for International Security, ed. Scott Jasper (Washington:
Georgetown University Press, 2012), 56.
27 Joyce P. Kaufman, A Concise History Of US Foreign Policy (Plymouth, UK: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2010), 78.
24
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system and their own respective regions toward their own ideological
leanings. While not an inclusive list, the United States initiated military,
political, and proxy operations in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954),
Vietnam/Indochina (1961-1973), Brazil (1964), Dominican Republic (1965),
Greece (1967), Chile (1970-1973), Angola (1975-1991), Afghanistan (19801992), Grenada (1983), Nicaragua (1983-1990), and Panama (1989).28 Many
efforts were successful in achieving some American goals.29 Most of these
actions violated international laws, treaties, and norms, but the United States
engaged in them anyways. The Soviet Union operated along similar lines in
trying to subvert other countries toward Soviet interests in Eastern Europe,
Central, and South America, and non-aligned states in Asia.30 This bi-polar
order led to a 'push-pull' narrative between two great powers, where they
touted international laws, values, and norms, for propaganda purposes.31 The
United States and Soviet Union managed to engage in such indirect conflicts,
while avoiding direct military confrontation. Such bipolar competition
between the two, indirectly led to a high-degree of international stability,
tampering large-scale violence between the two, permitting what many
referred to as the “long peace.”32 At the same time, the deterrence inherent
during this period centered on the idea of leadership in both countries
understanding the grave consequences of a war between each other.33
In the post-Cold War order, the nature of conflict has changed and the most
defining point of the ‘gray zone’ missed by many analysts is the contemporary
nature of the international system. The United States cannot engage in the
same sort of ‘gray’ behavior it once did during the Cold War, largely because
Stephen Van Evera, “American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future,” Fall 2010,
available at: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-40-american-foreignpolicy-past-present-future-fall-2010/index.htm.
29 The United States failed in maintaining South Vietnam as a viable country, to include
the long-term failure in Iran, where the United States backed overthrow of a
democratically elected leader and installation of an autocratic leader favorable to US
interests eventually led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
30 William Rosenau, “Subversion Old and New,” War on the Rocks, April 24, 2014,
available at: http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/subversion-old-and-new/.
31 The Soviet premier, Khrushchev, went to great lengths to shame the US over the U-2
spying incident. More available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0501.html.
32 Alvin M. Saperstein, “The "Long Peace"—Result of a Bipolar Competitive
World?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:1 (1991): 68-79, available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/174204.
33 Khrushchev and JFK both arrived at the same conclusion at the end of the Cuban
Missile Crisis that there needed to be a better way to avoid miscommunication and
mediate any potential conflict between each country. For that reason, a ‘hotline’ was
installed in 1963 to permit instant communication between the United States and
Russian leadership. More available at: http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-05/whitehouse-kremlin-hotline-avoiding-war-50-years.
28
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the United States has taken responsibility for maintaining the current system
and its rules. Mearsheimer’s assertion about hegemonic theory is buttressed
by the US seeking to prevent the rise of any regional hegemon by acting as an
offshore balancer.34 However, this also presents a major limitation of action.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the U.S engaged in numerous
“gray zone approaches” to fight proxy wars against one another, but most
importantly, neither country went to war with one another.35 In a bipolar
order, there was no hegemon with a perceived control on the world narrative.
Competing interests led the United States and Soviet Union to engage in ‘gray’
hostile activities to defend their narratives, rationalized through ideological
lenses, and dogmatic understandings of their role in the world. This era
experienced more inter-state violence, but since the end of the Cold War,
intra-state conflicts (i.e. civil wars) are the primary source of violence in the
world.36
Now the international system is entrenched around the centrality of American
hegemony as the sole-proprietor on how states should behave. This normative
expectation undercuts the United States ability to engage in 'gray zone'
activities, as it is much easier for various actors to highlight some United
States actions as hypocritical or antithetical to Western values. This systemic
shift has implicitly forced the United States to further comply with norms,
laws, treaties, and statutes it helped create and institutionalize.37 It ties the
hands of the United States, exposing it to international condemnation
whenever it deviates from protocols (e.g., Iraq War, CIA terrorist rendition
flights, etc.) that the United States has obliged on the rest of the world.38 As

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton &
Company, 2001).
35 Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
(February 2016), available at: http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-grayzone/.
36 Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of
Peace Research 52:4 (2015): 536-550, available at:
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343315595927/.
37 One could make an argument that the U.S. arming of Syrian rebels is a ‘gray zone
approach’, and to a certain extent, it is, but at the same time, the United States did not
proactively initiate the insurgency; it merely added more kerosene to the Syrian wildfire.
38 Ewen MacAskill and Julian Borger, “Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN Charter,
says Annan,” The Guardian, September 15, 2004, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq; BBC, “War Draws
Condemnation,” BBC News, March 20, 2003, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2867027.stm; Ruth Blakeley and Sam
Raphael, “The Rendition Project: Researching The Globalization of Rendition and Secret
Detention,” Rendition Research Team, University of Kent, 2015, available at:
http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/news/index.html; D. J. Pangburn, “Track the
CIA's Secret Rendition Flights with a New Interactive Map,” Vice News: Motherboard,
34

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss3/2
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.3.1589

8

Matisek: Shades of Gray Deterrence

the sole superpower, US national interests are pervasive in attempting to
maintain favorable economic dominance, geo-political influence, and
security. This type of environment puts the United States in a position where
it is more apt to suffer numerous minor losses, with incremental wins a rarity.
Thus, modern ‘gray wars’ should require practitioners of war and
policymakers to think differently about deterrence, perhaps even dispensing
with traditional notions of deterrence altogether.
Old fashion deterrence does not seem to work against violent non-state
actors, or clandestine state military forces acting unconventionally. Even
‘talking big and carrying a big stick’ as US President Donald Trump enjoys
doing, does little to deter enemies operating in the ‘gray zone’ because their
leaders (and followers) do not fear the coercive consequences. ISIS fighters,
Houthi Rebels, and Taliban insurgents (and many others) have made plenty
of territorial gains in the face of airstrikes.39 Thus, most hostile actors are
likely aware of such modicums of American behavior, to include the typical
‘package’ of incremental escalation, as seen in America’s gradual actions in
Vietnam (1955-1975) and the Kosovo Air Campaign in 1999.Such foes have a
keen awareness about American risk avoidance given persistent and banal
platitudes concerning “boots on the ground.”40 In extreme cases, some groups
such as ISIS even welcome a final conventional battle with Western forces to
fulfill millenarian doomsday prophecies.41 Deterrence does little or nothing to
influence their political calculus in pursuit of their overall objectives. When
military force is applied, it results in changes in operations and tactics by the
opposing force, such as how the Taliban has only engaged in two conventional
battles against ISAF troops since being handily defeated in its first
May 28, 2013, available at: http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/track-the-cias-secretrendition-flights-with-a-new-interactive-map.
39 Anne Barnard and Thomas Erdbrink, “ISIS Makes Gains in Syria Territory Bombed by
Russia,” The New York Times, October 9, 2015, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/hussein-hamedani-irangeneral-killed-in-syria.html; Edward Yeranian, “Saudi-led Airstrikes Hit Yemen's Houthi
Rebels,” Voice of America, April 20, 2015, available at:
http://www.voanews.com/content/saudi-led-airstrikes-hit-yemen-houthirebels/2726922.html; Karoun Demirjian, “Russian Airstrikes in Syria, Taliban Rising,
CIA Pullback from China,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2015, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/09/30/russianairstrikes-in-syria-taliban-rising-cia-pullback-from-china/. Coalition airstrikes appear
to work best against insurgent fighters when accomplished in conjunction with ‘friendly’
forces on the ground.
40 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail,” Foreign Affairs 92:4 (2013): 44-54, available
at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-fail.
41 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, (March 2015), available at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-reallywants/384980/.
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conventional assault against ISAF troops during Operation Medusa in 2006.42
Similar adaptations by ISIS fighters have shown their resilience, by adjusting
their tactics to American airpower, to include using sandstorms and cloud
cover to stage overwhelming ground attacks in Syria and Iraq.43
More importantly, most of these armed groups are not concerned with
adhering to Western standards of warfare and governance or participation in
the Westphalian system of states. Instead, they use such principals against the
United States as a way of winning strategically despite losing at the tactical
level. The Vietnamese Tet Offensive (1968) was an early example: The United
States overwhelmingly defeated North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces, and
yet, it was a strategic loss of the informational narrative over war efforts in
Vietnam (domestically and globally).44 The American military has no problem
defeating an adversary in the conventional realm, but winning a war over
ideology or a heightened identity is not how the US military is organized to
fight. Such endemic problems are similar to Emile Simpson’s observation that
“The possibility that one can ‘win militarily’ but lose a war is indeed perverse
logic; it totally unhinges strategic theory, as it disconnects the use of force
from political purpose.”45 Such frustration illuminates the current issues that
seem solvable by military force, and yet do not address the underlying root
cause, which, as indicated by seminal studies on civil wars by leading
scholars, involve weak and poor states.46

Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2012), 113-117. Since Operation Medusa in 2006, the Taliban have only
waged two conventional style attacks against United States ISAF. The first was the Battle
of Wanat in 2008 and the second was the Battle of Kamdesh in 2009. For an explanation
of why the Taliban likely decided to conduct conventional assaults on these two occasions
refer to Anthony King, “On Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the
Primary Group Thesis,” Security Studies 25:4 (2016): 699-728,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1220205.
43 ISIS fighters consistently take advantage of bad weather defined here as conditions that
prevent coalition aircraft from conducting airstrikes and reconnaissance. Information on
important ISIS operation under the cover of weather is available at:
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-uses-sandstorm-as-cover-to-seize-new-areas-insyria/.
44 James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), 119.
45 Emile Simpson, War from The Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat As Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012,) 138.
46 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic
Papers 56:4 (2004): 563-595, available at:
https://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/Courses/Readings/CollierHoeffler.pdf; James
D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, And Civil War,” American
Political Science Review 97:1 (2003): 75-90, available at:
https://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/Courses/Readings/CollierHoeffler.pdf.
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Even selective targeting of jihadists raises numerous concerns. Jihadists seem
to experience a ‘popularity boost’ when killed in a targeted operation, whereas
jihadists captured by counterinsurgents experience no increase in
popularity.47 It seems as if killing an insurgent or terrorist (or their leader)
does little to nothing in defeating or undermining a political alignment or
ideology. The precipitous rise of Boko Haram violence primarily came after
Nigerian security forces captured, tortured, and then murdered its leader
Mohammed Yusuf by in 2009.48 Such martyrdom only adds to narratives and
reinforces grievances, which gray zone actors employ to advance their cause
and increase recruitment.49 At the same time, the immediacy of
communications is helping change the narratives in conflicts. Such a dramatic
change, aids asymmetric flows of information and reinforces United States
vulnerabilities and limitations as custodian of an international system based
upon a set of rules, norms, and laws.

Rise of Global Communications
The information revolution further complicates the ability of the United
States to deter adversarial actions. The spread of the internet, social media,
YouTube, and portable electronic devices, adds to a sense of uncertainty in a
globalized world where no single state or actor can exert complete control
over the informational narratives in a conflict. For instance, an American
airstrike could kill an insurgent/terrorist in the deserts of Yemen or foothills
of Pakistan, but if local actors can shape the death narrative – locally and
internationally – as unjust indiscriminate violence, then it undermines the
outcome intended by the United States. This globalization makes deterrence
even more problematic.
How do you deter an individual, a group, or even a state, from taking part in
actions that would almost certainly result in a harsh punishment (e.g.
targeted airstrike, sanctions, etc.) from the United States and her allies? A
simplistic answer would be that such actors are not rational and do not
understand the kinetic consequences of such provocative behavior, but such
an interpretation, as illustrated in previous sections, is naïve. Such actors
Richard A. Nielsen, “Can Ideas Be “Killed?” Evidence from Counterterror Targeting of
Jihadi Ideologues,” January 12, 2016, Working Paper. Workshop on Ideas and Political
Violence, University of Chicago on January 27, 2016.
48 Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation
Perspective,” African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review 3:1 (2013): 144-157, available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.3.1.144?seq=1#page_scan_tab_
contents.
49 J.B. Walker. Nightcap at Dawn: American Soldiers’ Counterinsurgency in Iraq (New
York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012).
47
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have a different set of assumptions about how the world should operate,
leading to their own rational decision-making process, which a materialist
Western audience finds difficult to understand, because it is difficult to
believe that death does not deter such individuals. A more nuanced
understanding of this requires an appreciation for the mosaic of discourses
and narratives between the micro and macro levels. In essence, it is vital to
understand the social terrain surrounding a conflict and the reasons
surrounding ‘gray’ behavior that appears to be ‘irrational’ to an outside
observer, but is in fact sensible for such a person, organization, or state in that
situation.
The advent of instantaneous global communications makes it difficult for the
United States to control perceived narratives at the international, state, and
local levels. American media has to contend with numerous sources of
information that can be dubious in nature, but be much more persuasive and
influential. The internet age combined with the rise of social media has
created a “social space” that now decides power, facilitating “insurgent
politics and social movements.”50 Per Will Reno, such “social space” has
always been a necessary core to any uprising or rebel group, serving as an
incubator for ideology and political aspirations.51 Accordingly, some have
even argued that social media platforms, such as Facebook, are undermining
democratic institutions worldwide by creating different (and conflicting)
versions of truth and facts. It is in this type of space (originally referred to as
“fields of leverage” in 1969), that the internet has enabled the mobilization of
people with similar ideas, further polarizing them (and others) toward the
pursuit of self-interested political objectives. 52 It also is far easier for ‘gray
actors’ to advance their own movement by manipulating social media
platforms to fit their agenda.
Consequently, the internet age provides an advantage to non-state actors that
participate in the gray zone, because of the asymmetric informational
advantage provided in the collection and dissemination of information versus
Manuel Castells, “Communication, Power And Counter-Power In The Network
Society,” International Journal of Communication 1, no. 1 (2007): 29, available at:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKE
wiWjLv99PVAhVHLSYKHTm0AjcQFggoMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fijoc.org%2Findex.php%2Fijo
c%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F46%2F35&usg=AFQjCNGQI6osPKxNNZfhWyrznM_tkmtfA.
51 William Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 9.
52 Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1969),
288–91.
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large bureaucratic states that are slow to adapt and counteract such forces.53
Similarly, such technology also facilitates political and strategic narratives
between states engaged in gray zone warfare. For example, state-run media
outlets such as RT and Sputnik News push overly strong Russian narratives
and critical interpretations of United States and NATO behavior on English
speaking audiences worldwide, to include native-tongue broadcasts and
websites in regions of the world lacking Western media penetration. The
United States cannot wholly corral its media into a unitary perspective on
issues, which leads to fragmentation of informational narratives and mixed
messaging toward intended actors. At the same time, the existence of United
States funded media outlets, such as Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, might appear to be the same propaganda as Russian
backed media outlets. However, such Russian outlets express “a deep
skepticism of Western and American narratives of the world and a
fundamental defensiveness about Russia and Mr. Putin,” whereas US backed
outlets do push US interests in subtle ways, they “don’t shy away from stories
that don’t shed the best light on the United States.”54 Such a fragmented
environment illustrating US behavior in the international system combined
with the information revolution has made it difficult for the United States to
reclaim its West versus East narrative established during the Cold War.
In ‘gray zone’ conflicts, foes exploit these newfound US vulnerabilities. The
United States is operating in a new system, with more information and
narratives than it can shape and control, and American political and military
leadership can no longer purposively violate the rules in the international
system without widespread condemnation, which can seriously impede US
interests and attempts to shape foreign entities.

Creating Gray Deterrence
While more conflicts are operating in the “gray zone,” American foreign policy
strategy fails to address the simple desires of those at the local level.55 Besides
Mary McEvoy Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace: The Colonizing
of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik,” International Studies Quarterly 54:2
(2010): 381-401, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00592.x.
54 Steven Erlanger, “Russia’s RT Network: Is It More BBC or K.G.B.?” The New York
Times, March 8, 2017, available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/europe/russias-rt-network-is-it-morebbc-or-kgb.html; John Hudson, “U.S. Repeals Propaganda Ban, Spreads GovernmentMade News to Americans,” Foreign Policy, July 14, 2013, available at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/14/u-s-repeals-propaganda-ban-spreadsgovernment-made-news-to-americans/.
55 Philip Kapusta, “Defining the Gray Zone,” Special Warfare 28:4, (October-December
2015): 18-25, available at:
53
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applying “top-down” solutions, there is also a need to address emerging
threats and conflicts from the “bottom-up” by considering the local politics
that may drive warfare at the national level.56 Understanding the varying
shades of gray can facilitate greater conceptualizations and methods to
interpret the actions of non-state and state actions and create specific gray
deterrent measures.
The term “gray deterrence” has yet to be coined, but can best be understood
as creative actions (such as informational operations and well-considered
uses of military force) taken by the United States to deter a ‘gray’ opponent
(state or non-state actor) that is undermining American national interests and
international system. Such deterrence actions capitalize on ‘gray’ actor’s
rational political objective calculations by changing their interpretation of the
cost-benefit analysis. This “gray deterrence” puts more emphasis on shaping
political and informational outcomes against an adversary, rather than using
military forces in the vain pursuit of a pivotal battle (or elimination of an
influential leader). It puts a premium on pursuing a political resolution rather
than a military solution. The stark fact is that since the 1960s, only 7 percent
of insurgencies and terrorist groups have been defeated militarily, whereas 83
percent of these groups ceased to operate due to policing and/or
politicization.57 This means that major powers, and particularly the leader of
the global system, must explore strategies that minimize the ‘social spaces’ in
which such groups emerge and expand.
As author, Louise Richardson writes in What Terrorists Want, “Terrorists are
neither crazy nor amoral but rather are rationally seeking to achieve a set of
objectives within self-imposed limits.”58 All too often, U.S strategy operates in
a macro-level fashion against these ‘gray’ adversaries under the assumption
that such policies will deter, deny, and/or defeat them. Such a naïve belief is
centered on the assumption that adversaries lack agency, and will not adapt
or evolve in the face of American power. Numerous officials interviewed at the
Pentagon and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) espoused this attitude. One
high-ranking officer even stated, “eliminating al-Shabaab is the easy part; the

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20Special%20
Warfare.pdf.
56 Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of
International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
57 Vision of Humanity: Global Terrorism Index, Institute for Economics and Peace,
(2014), available at:
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/ourgtifindings.
58 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the
Threat (New York: Random House Incorporated, 2007), 20.
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hard part is getting the institutions of Somalia to work.”59 Such commentary
from officials tasked with dealing with a gray zone actor is not promising.
Worse yet, official AFRICOM policy is not to interact with Somaliland – a selfdeclared autonomous state – despite a high ranking British officer lamenting
that the territory is a “home base for al-Shabaab…regularly used for ‘R and
R’…and that the current American counterterrorism strategy to build a selfsufficient Somali state will only be possible if Somaliland is made a part of the
solution.”60
Similar Western arrogance in fighting was best identified by Bernard Fall in
his book on Vietnam, Street Without Joy, where Fall astutely identified that
French (and Western) military weapons and technological superiority could
not overcome the issues of terrain and people, of which, both were the
instrumental variables to overcome in a political war (i.e. a revolution).61
Prophetically, he warned in 1961 that United States involvement in Vietnam
would fail because it would not overcome the same problems the French faced
(e.g. terrain, reliance on technology, etc.). Along similar lines, the ‘father’ of
counterinsurgency warfare, David Galula, noted that the population is the
primary objective in such wars. The success of insurgents and
counterinsurgents, he wrote, is dependent upon their ability to control the
population and “get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final
analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit
agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”62 As
evidenced by the involvement of the United States directly and indirectly in
conflicts, why does the United States struggle with winning over the
population?
As Trinquier viewed modern warfare (in his day, but still applicable), he saw
“an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological,
military” to overthrow the government and replace it.63 The rise of ISIS in
Fieldwork interviews at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and US Africa Command in
Stuttgart, Germany, conducted July 27, 2017, through August 5, 2017; Quote from U.S.
Military Officer in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy section, Personal
Communication, October 19, 2015.
60 United Kingdom Military Officer, Personal Communication, August 8, 2017.
61 Fall, Bernard, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina (Barnsley, UK:
Pen and Sword, 2005). There is a good argument to be had that such counterinsurgency
operations have to be conducted because traditional military deterrence failed, but
paradoxically it seems that many counterinsurgent forces are trying to state-build while
engaged in military operations.
62 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 6.
63 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).
59
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Syria and Iraq is a prima facie case of a quasi-state revolution formed out of a
crude brew of terrorists, insurgents, criminals, thugs, warlords, militias, exSaddam troops, adventure seekers, and religious zealots. Their rise partly
came from their political ability to capitalize on mistakes that occurred during
the United States occupation of Iraq (such as the ill-timed de-Ba’athification
program, Abu Ghraib atrocities, numerous Blackwater incidents, etc.) and
subsequent Iraqi central government mismanagement and alienation of
Sunnis in western Iraq.64 ISIS leaders used such issues in political messaging
to increase recruitment and win over militant groups, while pursuing the
consolidation of their power under economic ties to black-market oil
smuggling – these trafficking networks emerged during Saddam-era
sanctions.65 With economic strength came a greater ability to establish
patronage and clientelistic networks in the region that fell in line with ISIS.
From a psychological perspective, ISIS instilled fear in its territories by
meting out harsh punishments under fanatic interpretations of Sharia Law.66
Each of Trinquier’s ‘interlocking systems’ operated in conjunction with ISIS
military power, where its fighters quickly defeated and overran Syrian and
Iraqi military positions and bases, despite having fewer personnel, less
training, and less advanced weaponry, relative to Iraqi and Syrian troops.67

Hal Brands and Peter Feaver. “Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?” Survival 59:3 (2017):
7-54, available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2017579b/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-june-july-2017-3a5f/59-3-02-brands-andfeaver-a7bf; Lina Khatib “How ISIS capitalizes on horrors of Blackwater and Abu
Ghraib,” CNN, April 15, 2015, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/15/opinions/blackwater-abu-ghraib-isis/; Priyanka
Boghani, “In Their Own Words: Sunnis on Their Treatment in Maliki’s Iraq,” PBS:
Frontline, October 28, 2014, available at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-theirtreatment-in-malikis-iraq/; A history of Blackwater incidents in Iraq is available at:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17269881.
65 Carl Simpson and Matthew Philips, “Why US Efforts to Cut Off Islamic State's Funds
Have Failed,” Bloomberg Business, November 19, 2015, available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-19/why-u-s-efforts-to-cut-offislamic-state-s-funds-have-failed?cmpid=BBD111915_BIZ.
66 BBC. “What is ‘Islamic State’?” BBC News, December 2, 2015, available at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.
67 Priya Joshi, “Isis Behead Assad Soldiers After Overrunning Syrian Army Base,”
International Business Times, July 26, 2014, available at:
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-behead-assad-soldiers-after-over-running-syrianarmy-base-1458385; Martin Chulov, Fazel Hawramy, and Spencer Ackerman, “Iraq
Army Capitulates to ISIS Militants in Four Cities,” The Guardian, June 11, 2014, available
at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-eaststates; Greg Botelho and Chelsea J. Carter, “Latest Rout Raises Questions About Iraqi
Military's Ability to Defeat ISIS,” CNN, September 25, 2014, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/world/meast/iraq-isis-rout-questions/.
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The resulting capture of advanced military hardware further empowered ISIS
to exert control over its region, while consolidating political control and
providing a degree of ‘order’. Ahmad first identified the ability of an extremist
organization to emerge within a weak state and exert control through the
provision of security services, coining the expression ‘Islamo-Gangsterism’ to
explain organized crime groups that blended jihadism into protection rackets,
capitalizing on its religious identity. This served as an informal mechanism to
regulate social and economic behavior.68 Thus, ISIS can operate across
numerous environments using its religious identity as a means of
institutionalizing informal rule through the provision of basic public goods.
When the United States and its coalition attempts to fight ISIS on the ground,
it is having to overcome multiple layers of control and locally constructed
narratives, as evidenced by almost one-third of Iraqis believing that ISIS is
backed by America.69
Finally, some rebel groups have little interest in taking over the state, and
instead pursue limited strategies to fulfil basic material interests. For
example, Reno has identified that since the 1980s, non-state actors with
limited aims (warlords and parochial rebels) are emerging in weak and
corrupt states. Such newer groups are interested in financial gain and
maintaining control over areas that suit their ideological, business, and/or
communal identity interests (for instance, of a local ethnic group), while
tapping into and exploiting patronage networks of the political elite.70 To such
non-state actors, local politics matter most, and national level politics matter
little unless directly impeding their limited material pursuits. Such groups are
only subversive toward their governments for the purposes of manipulating
patronage networks, but such actions rarely involve them trying to usurp the
regime and govern.
Perhaps it is time the United States focus on penetrating patron-client
networks in certain conflict zones, if it wishes to succeed in undermining
bases of support. This concept is not novel, as Kimberly Marten illustrated
how Georgian President Saakashvili was able to penetrate warlord patronclient networks in Ajar and Kodori, facilitating the defeat and ousting of

Aisha Ahmad, “The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War
Somalia,” International Security 39:3 (2015): 89–117, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00187.
69 Lee Ferran, “One third of Iraqis think US supports Terrorism, ISIS,” ABC News, April
7, 2016, available at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/iraqis-us-supportsterrorism-isis/story?id=38220207.
70 Reno, Warfare in independent Africa.
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warlords in these two regions of Georgia.71 How so? Saakashvili relied on
“fine-grained intelligence about how the warlord networks worked and who
the individual supporters of the warlords were.” This was discovered through
his fathers’ familial contacts, allowing him to rollback various communal
layers of families “who had earlier supported the warlords, through promises
of future political and economic cooperation.”72 Unfortunately, the murky
methods Saakashvili utilized to rid his country of these warlords would not be
possible in a traditional liberal state.

Understanding ‘Gray’ State Actors
State actors that engage in gray zone operations are aware of their decisionmaking process and political objectives. Russian General Gerasimov wrote
that “a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be
transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign
intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and
civil war.”73 He wrote this a year prior to the events in Ukraine. Gerasimov
discussing his thoughts on the changing state of war is indicative of a state
actor recognizing the emergence and implicit pursuit of ‘gray wars’ that is new
in its form, shape, and ability to overcome international pressures. 74 In
addition, Gerasimov goes on to mention the need for his Army to adapt to
new combat methods:
“Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use,
enabling the nullification of an enemy's advantages in armed
conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations
forces and internal opposition to create a permanently
operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state,
as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are
constantly being perfected.”75

Kimberly Marten, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2012).
72 Marten, Warlords, 65.
73 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” MilitaryIndustrial Kurier, February 27, 2013.
74 Russian General Gerasimov does not explicitly mention “gray wars” in his MilitaryIndustrial Kurier article, but the terms and conceptions used to illuminate recent
changes in ‘combat action’ point toward what many other “gray zone” scholars (see
Cleveland, Pick, and Farris, 2015) that perceive it as a new and salient form of warfare.
75 Gerasimov, Military-Industrial Kurier, 2013, 3.
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Crimea was a test case within almost 13 months of his writing, as Russia
eventually annexed the territory. Since then, the troubles in the greater
Donbas region of Ukraine have only worsened as suspected Russian troops
have been training pro-Russian separatist groups, to include the mobilization
of soccer clubs in southern and eastern Ukraine into pro-Russian militias.76
Unfortunately, for the Ukrainian government, the United Nations and
numerous other countries have been unable to adequately develop policies or
implement strategies to stave off future incursions. The US response has
amounted to some protests, sanctions against Russia, press conferences
displaying satellite imagery of Russian military equipment in Ukraine, and
providing “non-lethal assistance” to Ukraine.77 Finally, to reassure allies, the
United States has increased military deployments, exercises, and shows of
force in Central and Eastern Europe.78 However, none of this has tempered
Russia’s provocative military actions, as evidenced by numerous events in the
Baltic Sea and Black Sea region, where Russian jets have frequently taunted
and harassed several American ships and aircraft.79

Forging Ahead with Gray Deterrence
It is crucial for the United States to identify how it can develop a “gray
deterrence” that exploits legal loopholes in warfighting, along with engaging
in information operations to deny, discredit, and delegitimize adversary use
Vitaly Shevchenko, “"Little green men" or "Russian invaders"?” BBC News, March 11,
2014, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154; Evidence
obtained by William Reno in his correspondence with a political contact in Eastern
Ukraine (2014), showing how Russia has been mobilizing numerous football clubs and
turning them into separatist militias that are against the central government of Ukraine.
77 Roman Olearchyk, Kathrin Hille, Courtney Weaver, and Richard McGregor, “Obama
Warns Putin Against Ukraine Intervention,” Financial times, March 2, 2014, available at:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5e71a73c-a12a-11e3-b72100144feab7de.html#axzz42Ac0e4Sf; Norman Hermant, “MH17 Anniversary: Russians
Feel Pinch of Trade Sanctions, Continue Support for Kremlin One Year On,” Australian
Broadcasting Corporation News, August 10, 2015, available at:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-12/russians-feeling-pinch-of-sanctions-oneyear-after-mh17-incident/6614094; Laurence Norman, “NATO Says Images Show
Russian Tanks in Ukraine,” The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2014, available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-says-images-show-russian-tanks-in-ukraine1402760713; Alasdair Sandford, “US to Send more Non-lethal Aid to Ukraine,” EURO
News, March 11, 2015, available at: http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/11/us-to-sendmore-non-lethal-aid-to-ukraine/.
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New York Times, February 1, 2016, available at:
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Close Range,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2017, available at:
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of social media to herald their cause. It also means employing kinetic
operations only when such actors attempt to fight conventionally (Al-Shabaab
recently for example), or when it is framed in such a way that defeats a foe’s
narrative or ideology, which necessitates shaping narratives at the ‘ground
level’. 80 Such “gray deterrence” strategies should capitalize on pre-deterrence
approaches that reduce the appeal of joining such groups in causes that
undermine US national interests and the international system. More
importantly, conducting such American deterrent actions should be in
conjunction with as many allies as possible, and in accordance with
constructivist interpretations of international laws and norms.

Gray Deterrence Strategies
One finding from author Emile Simpson’s book on his personal experience
fighting in Afghanistan is the need to fight an opponent’s narrative at the local
level in a conflict zone, which can be more important than combat
operations.81 This translates into the pursuit of shaping overall informational
narratives against adversaries by credibly demonstrating facts and disproving
adversarial accusations and innuendo. For example, when Russian President
Vladimir Putin gave a speech in 2014 justifying his actions – the annexation
of Crimea – his speech was similar in prose and verbosity to Hitler’s 1939
speech justifying his annexation of Danzig and the Corridor. Critics claimed
Putin had plagiarized the speech word for word.82 While such publicity
concerning Putin’s speech was heavily covered in the Ukrainian media (for
obvious reasons), Western media outlets barely covered the speech or its
implications.83 Even a Ukrainian Ambassador remarked that Russia is
conducting hybrid warfare against his country, using "propaganda, military
activities, economic pressure, social provocations, and political influence."84

Barbara Starr, “US claims to have killed 150 fighters from Al-Shabaab in Somalia,”
CNN, March 8, 2016, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/08/politics/somaliaus-claims-to-have-killed-150-fighters/.
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annexation,” EuroMaidan Press, March 16, 2015, available at:
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Annotated,” BBC, March 19, 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-26652058.
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Yet, there has been little agreement from the United States and West to
concur with this assessment. Such issues demand that American political and
military leadership draw attention to hypocrisies in international behavior
and follow with counter-narratives to include shaping such messages to
oppose adversarial storylines.
Researchers at The Program on Extremism at George Washington University
found that the suspension of ISIS social media accounts (i.e. Twitter) had a
dramatic effect on reducing the dissemination of their propaganda and the
number of overall followers longitudinally.85 General Votel took notice of such
research, and indicated to Congress that “[we need] to detect previously
unseen patterns in complex social media data…and respond to changes in the
information environment in real time.”86 Such capabilities are emerging
through new technologies that can predict “security events” based on social
media and internet traffic, which could be critical to the United States
determining where ‘gray’ actors might emerge and pose a risk to US national
interests.87
More extreme measures against terrorists (and their families) – as recently
suggested by some politicians – is strictly against international norms and
codes of conduct for professional militaries and the behavior of a modern
state in general.88 In essence, ‘gray deterrence’ needs to overcome terrorist
and insurgent calculus, while operating within international legal
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85 J.M. Berger and Heather Perez, “The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter:
How Suspensions Are Limiting the Social Networks of English-Speaking ISIS
Supporters,” The Program on Extremism at George Washington University, Occasional
Paper, February 2016, available at:
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Berger_Occasional%20Pape
r.pdf.
86 Leo Shane III, “America's Silent Warriors Look to Up Their Game on Social Media,”
Military Times, March 2, 2016, available at:
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/03/02/votel-socom-socialmedia/81210372/.
87 Patrick Tucker, “Thanks, America! How China’s Newest Software Could Predict, Track,
and Crush Dissent,” Defense One, March 7, 2016, available at:
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/03/thanks-america-china-aims-techdissent/126491/.
88 Louis Jacobson, “Geneva Conventions Bar Donald Trump's Idea of Killing Terrorists'
Ramilies, as Rand Paul Says,” Politicfact, December 17, 2015, available at:
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/dec/17/rand-paul/randpauls-right-geneva-conventions-bar-donald-tru/; ICRC, “Conflicts Not of An
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frameworks. Avoiding non-combatant deaths while capitalizing on
provisional loopholes that exploit the decision-making processes of gray
actors is vital to undermining their long-term capacity to act.89
Besides using gray deterrence strategies, there is a need to develop the human
capital necessary to properly develop and execute gray deterrence. This
means staffing the military and government with the necessary expertise to
address such complex challenges. For example, former commander of US
Special Operations Command, Eric Olson (ret.), argued that “We need experts
not just in warfare, but also in languages, foreign cultures, religions, global
micro-regions and more…and reject our traditional notion of military victory
in favor of local acceptance of enduring success.”90 Such reasoning could not
be further from reality, given that numerous military and state department
officials dedicated to various ‘hotspots’ in the world rarely have the language
and/or cultural knowledge to understand the various layers of contention
between various elites and groups.91 Conventional fighting between two
different state militaries is conceptually easy to plan for and strategize due to
the simplicity of dualistic interests in the outcome. However, multi-party
conflicts, where there is complicated violence (i.e. blurring lines of innocence
and guilt) in which identifying the source or adversary is difficult; muddles
traditional military approaches.
Besides developing human capital with the skills to address nuanced ‘gray’
areas of warfare, the U.S government, and military need to address cyber
warfare, which also falls into the realm of the gray zone. In 2007, Russian
hackers dismantled Estonian websites owned and operated by the
government and its businesses, in response to an Estonian political decision
to relocate a Soviet era war memorial and gravesite.92 Many speculate that the
Russian government sponsored the attacks, but the greater impact of the
cyber-attacks was not the actual attacks themselves, but the eventual creation
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of the Tallinn Manual by NATO academics. 93 This study addressed the
implications of cyber conflicts and warfare in regards to international law.
While the Tallinn Manual is a non-binding academic assessment of the past,
present, and future of cyber weaponization, it developed 95 “recommended
rules.” Major applicable concepts include holding a host state responsible for
cyber damages if the attacks emanated from the territory (whether it was state
sponsored or not) and states being allowed to engage in countermeasures (i.e.
cyber counter-attack) that rise to the same level as the adversary attack. In
addition, it also recommended that a state suffering a cyber "armed attack"
(causes death or injury) could respond with armed force (e.g. cyber or kinetic)
and permitted prosecution of military personnel and citizens for cyber 'war
crimes'.94 A former STRATCOM planner agrees, reckoning that policymakers
need to establish “clear and unambiguous thresholds for the use of force in
cyberspace…supplement such thresholds with credible threats of retaliation
not only in cyberspace, but also across all domains,” while integrating such
wording into NATO’s mutual defense treaty (Article V).95 In essence, the
United States needs to advertise its retaliatory and punitive actions that will
be taken when such lines are crossed, while bolstering allies ability to
withstand (and respond to) cyber-attacks. Such actions should make dubious
opponents fully aware of the consequences of meddling with American
national interests in the cyber domain.
Finally, and probably the most difficult of deterrence strategies is the concept
of pre-deterrence, in trying to deter individuals are from joining an
insurgency or terrorist group. Such pre-deterrence must avoid over-reliance
on coercive force (i.e. compellence) to change the behavior of an adversary.96
Focusing on eliminating whatever gray zone leader emerges is not a “silver
bullet” either, as recent research shows a mixed bag of effectiveness in
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been used to target US spies available at: http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-cyberspy-20150831-story.html; Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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leadership decapitation.97 This means the United States needs to collaborate
with allies to support states that have structural conditions conducive to
terrorists and insurgents, proactively engaging in nation and state building.
What type of states need this assistance? Fearon and Laitin have noted five
conditions favor insurgency:
1. poverty,
2. financially and bureaucratically weak states (i.e. favors rebel
recruitment), political instability,
3. rough terrain,
4. large populations.98
Decades before this seminal 2003 article by Fearon and Laitin, Gulula
identified the issue of weak states, and believed that the development of a
strong “political machine” would be more effective against insurgencies. He
contended it would bring credibility and legitimacy to the regime, serving as a
counter to the ideological appeals of joining the insurgency.99 It should be no
surprise then that some scholars are advocating for “social cohesion” policies
in the West, to increase the legitimacy of the state and integrate immigrants
and second-generation immigrants.100 The observations of Samuel
Huntington concerning weak state institutions are truer than ever: “The
primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order.
Men may of course have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty
without order.”101 Thus, dampening ‘gray actor’ ideologies, makes it necessary
to facilitate the creation of order in countries through institutions, to deter the
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emergence of opportunistic ‘gray’ actors that, for example, have exploited the
chaos and anarchy derived from the Arab Spring.102

Conclusion
The United States has found itself in a position of strength corralled by
weakness at the turn of the 21st century. The international system of rules
tilts toward US preferences, however, such rules have made it paradoxically
difficult for the United States to engage in subversive and indirect wars as it
once did during the Cold War. America now finds itself, and its national
interests, under attack by ‘gray’ state and non-state actors that exploit blurred
lines of sovereignty, rules, and laws, to gain an advantage, thus weakening
America’s international order. Unfortunately, America still relies on
traditional deterrence strategies that worked better in a bipolar world order.
American approaches to dealing with political warfare fall short, especially
with the rise of global communication technology, media, and social
networking platforms. Such communicative mediums undercut US attempts
to control strategic narratives, while also serving as an ‘intellectual paradise’
for gray actors, where such ‘social space’ enables recruitment, facilitates
ideological development, and inspires others to join such ‘gray’ causes. Such
global forces necessitate that the United States respond with gray deterrence
strategies that focus on the root cause and local politics of gray actors as a
means of preventing the causes that typically bring them strength, while also
exercising prudent applications of military force. At the same time, however,
the United States and Western allies do themselves a disservice, when they
support illiberal regimes in Africa and the Middle East.103 Such hypocrisy only
feeds extremist sentiments, providing more fodder to their anti-Western
narratives. Moreover, the perception that the United States is unable to
govern adequately through norms it attempts to promote globally, allows
countries such as China to poke holes in American and Western narratives
about human rights.104
Most importantly, gray zone conflicts are a catch-22. Trying to robustly ‘win’
in the near term against gray zone actors is not only infeasible but also
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undermines prospects of ‘winning’ the conflict over the long-term and may
result in offshoot conflicts emerging (i.e. the rise of ISIS in other parts of the
world). Playing the long game is equally as frustrating for domestic audiences
(and politicians) that are used to the gravitas and bravado associated with
American military might. This mental trap is best embodied by General
George Patton’s aphorism “America loves a winner, and will not tolerate a
loser, this is why America has never, and will never, lose a war.”105 Such a
warrior spirit is commendable, but not the point or path to victory in the gray
zone. Instead, participation in such conflicts will necessitate a focus on
“marginal success,” where minor victories at the tactical level translate into
national strength and state capacity over the long term.106 Therefore, even a
focus on ‘winning’ may undercut the pursuit of American national security
objectives. Success is truly dependent upon military and political leaders
exercising strategic patience, so they can embrace the need to think long-term
and devise innovative means of deterring and defeating “gray zone” actors.
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